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Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Sicherung

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  • Stefan Homburg

Abstract

Die anhaltend hohe Arbeitslosigkeit hat verstärkt zu Diskussionen geführt, ob das Steuer-Transfer-System hierfür mitverantwortlich sei. Dabei wurde insbesondere auf die sehr hohe implizite Grenzbelastung im untersten Einkommensbereich hingewiesen. Als Alternativen wurden eine negative Einkommensteuer, negative Grenzsteuersätze oder Arbeitsverpflichtungen für Transferempfänger vorgeschlagen. Die Arbeit würdigt diese Instrumente analytisch und zeigt, dass negative Grenzsteuersätze oder Arbeitsverpflichtungen nicht die erhofften Wohlfahrtswirkungen haben.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Homburg, 2003. "Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Sicherung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(1), pages 68-82.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:72-10-6
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.72.1.68
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    2. Homburg, Stefan, 2003. "Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Sicherung," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 68-82.
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    7. Diamond, P., 1980. "Income taxation with fixed hours of work," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 101-110, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hermann Buslei & Viktor Steiner, 2003. "Anreizwirkungen von Lohnsubventionen: welche Bedeutung haben sie für die aktuelle Reformdiskussion?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(1), pages 94-108.
    2. Jacobebbinghaus, Peter & Steiner, Viktor, 2003. "Reforming Social Welfare as We Know It? A Microsimulation Study for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-33, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Hans-Werner Sinn & Christian Holzner & Wolfgang Meister & Wolfgang Ochel & Martin Werding, 2002. "Aktivierende Sozialhilfe - Ein Weg zu mehr Beschäftigung und Wachstum," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 55(09), pages 03-52, May.
    4. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen," IAB-Discussion Paper 200517, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    5. Homburg, Stefan, 2003. "Arbeitslosigkeit und soziale Sicherung," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 68-82.
    6. Lohse Tim, 2014. "The Objections against Workfare Revised," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 95-118, April.
    7. Sterner, Cornelia, 2010. "Ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen in Form der negativen Einkommensteuer: Eine soziologische und finanzwissenschaftliche Analyse [An unconditional basic income in the form of the negative income ta," MPRA Paper 39703, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2012.
    8. Dieckhoener, Caroline & Peichl, Andreas, 2009. "Financing Social Security: Simulating Different Welfare State Systems for Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 4135, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Breyer, Friedrich & Franz, Wolfgang & Homburg, Stefan & Schnabel, Reinhold & Wille, Eberhard, 2004. "Reform der sozialen Sicherung: Kurzfassung," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 92399.
    10. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Workfare : possibilities and limits)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 419-440.
    11. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Workfare : possibilities and limits)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 419-440.
    12. Koch, Susanne & Stephan, Gesine & Walwei, Ulrich, 2005. "Workfare: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen (Workfare : possibilities and limits)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 419-440.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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