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Optimal Taxes and Transfers under Partial Information

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  • Homburg Stefan

    (Chair of Public Finance, School of Economics and Management, University of Hannover, Königsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany)

  • Lohse Tim

    (Chair of Public Finance, School of Economics and Management, University of Hannover, Königsworther Platz 1, D-30167 Hannover, Germany)

Abstract

Effective from 2005, benefits for long-term unemployed have been reduced in Germany to the level of social assistance. This measure reflects the view that “all who are able to work, should work” - a view which makes sense only if the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive. In this paper we augment the standard model of optimal taxation, where the government has no information about individual productivities, by this very assumption: Partial information means that the government can distinguish the disabled from the productive, but cannot distinguish among the different productive types. An interesting proposition about the shape of optimal tax-transfer schemes under partial information is derived. Moreover, it is shown that unemployment on the side of the productive poor may still be optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Homburg Stefan & Lohse Tim, 2005. "Optimal Taxes and Transfers under Partial Information," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 225(6), pages 622-629, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:225:y:2005:i:6:p:622-629
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2005-0604
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sterner, Cornelia, 2010. "Ein bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen in Form der negativen Einkommensteuer: Eine soziologische und finanzwissenschaftliche Analyse [An unconditional basic income in the form of the negative income ta," MPRA Paper 39703, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2012.
    2. Tim Lohse, 2006. "Zum optimalen Verhältnis von Sozialhilfe und Arbeitslosengeld II [zwei] : Themenschwerpunkt Arbeitslosengeld II [zwei]," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(02), pages 16-19, 04.
    3. Krimmer, Pascal & Raffelhüschen, Bernd, 2007. "Grundsicherung in Deutschland: Analyse und Reformbedarf," FZG Discussion Papers 14, University of Freiburg, Research Center for Generational Contracts (FZG).
    4. Tim Lohse, 2006. "Zum optimalen Verhältnis von Sozialhilfe und Arbeitslosengeld II [zwei] : Themenschwerpunkt Arbeitslosengeld II [zwei]," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(02), pages .16-19, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal taxation; employment; poverty; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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