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Financing Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Romania – Challenges for Professional Accountants

Author

Listed:
  • Iuliana Oana MIHAI

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Romania)

  • Riana Iren RADU

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Romania)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review the scientific literature that explores the issue of funding political parties and election campaigns. The way whereby the parties manage to mobilize the financial resources to finance the activity is an important topic related to the organizational potential of the political parties. It is very important to integrate the principles of openness, transparency, and accountability in financing political parties and therefore, professional accountants are the key actors. Their role is to keep and report accurate and detailed records for each transaction related to the income and expenses incurred during the electoral campaign or current activity of the party. But sometimes, the accounting principles are in contradiction with the electoral regulations and this generates challenges for professional accountants.

Suggested Citation

  • Iuliana Oana MIHAI & Riana Iren RADU, 2021. "Financing Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Romania – Challenges for Professional Accountants," Economics and Applied Informatics, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 3, pages 57-61.
    • Handle: RePEc:ddj:fseeai:y:2021:i:3:p:57-61
    DOI: 10.35219/eai15840409224
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Song, B.K., 2020. "The effect of public financing on candidate reemergence and success in elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, March.
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