The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 30; figures: included. PDF file may be viewed or printed
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bender, Bruce, 1988. "An Analysis of Congressional Voting on Legislation Limiting Congressional Campaign Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(5), pages 1005-1021, October.
- Bernhardt, M. Daniel & Ingerman, Daniel E., 1985. "Candidate reputations and the `incumbency effect'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 47-67, June.
- Mueller, Dennis C & Stratmann, Thomas, 1994. "Informative and Persuasive Campaigning," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 55-77, October.
- Chamberlain, Gary & Rothschild, Michael, 1981. "A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 152-162, August.
- John Ledyard, 1984.
"The pure theory of large two-candidate elections,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 7-41, January.
- John Ledyard, 1983. "The Pure Theory of Large Two Candidate Elections," Discussion Papers 569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- D. Usher & M. Engineer, 1987.
"The distribution of income in a despotic society,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 261-276, August.
- Dan Usher & Merwan Engineer, 1986. "The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society," Working Paper 653, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
- Rebecca Morton & Charles Cameron, 1992. "Elections And The Theory Of Campaign Contributions: A Survey And Critical Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 79-108, March.
- Roger Congleton, 1989. "Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 101-118, August.
- Palda, Filip, 1993. "Can Repressive Regimes Be Moderated through Foreign Aid?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 535-550, November.
- K. Palda & Kristian Palda, 1985. "Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 313-331, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Thomas Sexton & Herbert Lewis, 2012. "Measuring efficiency in the presence of head-to-head competition," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 183-197, October.
- David Soberman & Loïc Sadoulet, 2007. "Campaign Spending Limits and Political Advertising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1521-1532, October.
- Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996.
"Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-19, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Gersbach, Hans, 1998. "Communication skills and competition for donors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-18, February.
- Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
- Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Tom LaGatta, 2017. "Group incentives and rational voting1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 299-326, April.
- Claudio Balestri, 2014. "Political Organizations, Interest Groups and Citizens Engagement: An Integrated Model of Democracy," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 533-543, December.
- Ignacio Ortuno‐Ortín & Christian Schultz, 2005.
"Public Funding of Political Parties,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(5), pages 781-791, December.
- Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuño Ortín, 2000. "Public Funding Of Political Parties," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Ignacio Ortuno Ortin & Christian Schultz, 2000. "Public Funding of Political Parties," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0735, Econometric Society.
- Christian Schultz & Ignacio Ortuno-OrtÍn, 2000. "Public Funding of Political Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 368, CESifo.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004.
"Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Ricard Gil, 2003. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," NBER Working Papers 10040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Grafstein, 2002. "What Rational Political Actors Can Expect," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 139-165, April.
- Filip Palda, 2001. "Election Finance Regulation in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Canada and the U.S," Public Economics 0111010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2021. "The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew, 2008.
"A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2240-2261, October.
- Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman, 2005. "A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda," NBER Working Papers 11375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandra Casella & Andrew Gelman, 2005. "A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda," Economics Working Papers 0060, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew, 2005. "A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda," CEPR Discussion Papers 5093, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dan Usher, 2014.
"An alternative explanation of the chance of casting a pivotal vote,"
Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(1), pages 105-138, February.
- Dan Usher, 2011. "An Alternative Explanation Of The Chance Of Casting A Pivotal Vote," Working Paper 1238, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Wittman, Donald, 2007.
"Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
- Wittman, Donald, 2005. "Candidate Quality, Pressure Group Endorsements, And The Nature Of Political Advertising," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2tw043ff, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Louis Kaplow & Scott Duke Kominers, 2020. "On the Representativeness of Voter Turnout," NBER Working Papers 26913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthew T. Cole & Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2018.
"Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest,"
The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 49(4), pages 419-436.
- Matthew T. Cole & Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2013. "Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest," Working Papers 1304, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
- Tuvana Pastine & Ivan Pastine & Matthew T. Cole, 2013. "Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest," Economics Department Working Paper Series n242-13.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- David J. Hebert & Richard E. Wagner, 2015. "Political Parties as Interest Groups," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001246, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michael Ensley, 2012. "Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 43-61, April.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010.
"Political Campaign Spending Limits,"
Economics Department Working Paper Series
n213-10.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Political campaign spending limits," Working Papers 201034, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Jordan Rappaport, 1997. "Extremist Funding, Centrist Voters, and Candidate Divergence," Research in Economics 97-06-059e, Santa Fe Institute.
More about this item
Keywords
Campaign spending spending limits; election finance regulation; economics of information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2001-11-21 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-POL-2001-11-21 (Positive Political Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0111011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.