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Domestic constituents and the formulation of WTO negotiating positions: what the delegates say

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  • ZAHRNT, VALENTIN

Abstract

The present article examines what influence various domestic constituents exert on the negotiating positions member states adopt in WTO trade rounds based on a survey of national delegations to the WTO. The findings show that in both developed and developing countries, a broad array of governmental and non-governmental actors substantially shape trade policy-making. At the cost of those ministries traditionally in charge of trade policy-making, many domestic constituents have increased their influence since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This leads to a discussion of the problematic implications of these developments towards more participatory trade policy-making for WTO negotiations.

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  • Zahrnt, Valentin, 2008. "Domestic constituents and the formulation of WTO negotiating positions: what the delegates say," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 393-421, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:wotrrv:v:7:y:2008:i:02:p:393-421_00
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