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Agency Conflicts in Closed-End Funds: The Case of Rights Offerings

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  • Khorana, Ajay
  • Wahal, Sunil
  • Zenner, Marc

Abstract

We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds from 1988–1998. On average, rights offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium. This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering. The premium decline is more severe when increases in the investment advisor's compensation are larger and when the fund uses affiliated brokerdealers to solicit subscriptions to the offer. A clinical analysis shows that rights offerings allow investment advisors to sidestep fee rebates and increase pecuniary benefits to affiliated entities. Overall, our results suggest the presence of significant conflicts of interest in rights offerings by closed-end funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Khorana, Ajay & Wahal, Sunil & Zenner, Marc, 2002. "Agency Conflicts in Closed-End Funds: The Case of Rights Offerings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 177-200, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:37:y:2002:i:02:p:177-200_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy R. Burch & Douglas R. Emery & Michael E. Fuerst, 2003. "What Can “Nine‐Eleven” Tell Us about Closed‐end Fund Discounts and Investor Sentiment?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(4), pages 515-529, November.
    2. Souther, Matthew E., 2018. "The effects of internal board networks: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 266-290.
    3. Elisabete Duarte Neves, 2014. "Ownership Structure and Investor¡¯s Sentiments for Dividends," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(2), pages 35-58, April.
    4. Kräussl, Roman & Pollet, Joshua M. & Stefanova, Denitsa, 2023. "Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms," CFS Working Paper Series 707, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Rina Rachmawati & Sugeng Wahyudi & Irene Rini Demi Pangestuti & Najmudin, 2020. "Funds Manager and Mutual Funds Characteristics on Mutual Funds Performance: Empirical Evidence of Equity Mutual Funds in Indonesia," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 11(2), pages 77-87, April.
    6. Kräussl, Roman & Pollet, Joshua & Stefanova, Denitsa, 2018. "Signaling or marketing? The role of discount control mechanisms in closed-end funds," CFS Working Paper Series 597, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    7. Dang, Li & Yang, J. Jimmy, 2013. "The choice between rights and underwritten equity offerings: Evidence from Chinese stock markets," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 235-253.
    8. Del Guercio, Diane & Dann, Larry Y. & Partch, M. Megan, 2003. "Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 111-152, July.
    9. Emmanouil Mavrakis, 2011. "Abnormal Returns on CEFs and in Pre-and-Post-Credit-Crunch Periods," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(4), pages 55-70.
    10. Dilip Patro & Louis R. Piccotti & Yangru Wu, 2017. "Exploiting Closed-End Fund Discounts: A Systematic Examination Of Alphas," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 40(2), pages 223-248, June.
    11. Souther, Matthew E., 2016. "The effects of takeover defenses: Evidence from closed-end funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 420-440.
    12. Johnson, Shane A. & Lin, Ji-Chai & Roy Song, Kyojik, 2006. "Dividend policy, signaling, and discounts on closed-end funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 539-562, September.
    13. Fu, Richard & Wedge, Lei, 2011. "Managerial ownership and the disposition effect," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 2407-2417, September.

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