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The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810–1850: A Puzzle

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  • Dye, Alan
  • La Croix, Sumner

Abstract

In early public land privatization, governments in New South Wales and Buenos Aires provided for de jure transfer of public lands. In New South Wales the government lost control; squatters rushed out unlawfully and seized de facto frontier claims. But in Buenos Aires privatization was accomplished by de jure transfers. Why did British settlers reject de jure transfers from a government, most able to secure property rights and rule of law, while settlers of the pampa frontier, where property-rights security was doubtful, complied with de jure transfers? We find that the revenue objective and violence on the frontier explain this puzzle.

Suggested Citation

  • Dye, Alan & La Croix, Sumner, 2013. "The Political Economy of Land Privatization in Argentina and Australia, 1810–1850: A Puzzle," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 901-936, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:73:y:2013:i:04:p:901-936_00
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    1. Alston, Lee J. & Libecap, Gary D. & Mueller, Bernardo, 1999. "A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform policy in Brazil," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 135-160, May.
    2. Alston, Lee J. & Harris, Edwyna & Mueller, Bernardo, 2012. "The Development of Property Rights on Frontiers: Endowments, Norms, and Politics," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 741-770, August.
    3. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
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    2. Dongwoo Yoo & Edwyna Harris, 2016. "Conditions of Successful Land Reform: A Study of Micronesia," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 56(3), pages 292-316, November.
    3. Carlos, Ann M. & Green, Erik & Links, Calumet & Redish, Angela, 2024. "Early-modern globalization and the extent of indigenous agency: Trade, commodities, and ecology," QUCEH Working Paper Series 24-04, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    4. Faguet, Jean-Paul & Sanches, Fábio & Villaveces, Marta-Juanita, 2016. "The paradox of land reform, inequality and local development in Colombia," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67193, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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