Is Japan Special? Monetary Linkages and Price Stability
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Cited by:
- Milhaupt, Curtis-J, 1999. "Japan's Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 17(2), pages 21-46, August.
- Cargill, Thomas, 2016. "The Myth of Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 06813, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
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