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Why Unanimity in the Council?

Author

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  • Mikko Mattila

    (University of Helsinki, Finland)

  • Jan-Erik Lane

    (University of Geneva, Switzerland)

Abstract

This article examines whether data on the voting patterns in the Council of Ministers lend support to the hypotheses that can be derived from some recent rational choice models of decision-making in the European Union. The findings show major discrepancies between the predictions of these spatial models and the empirical observations. Unanimous decision-making is much more frequent than one would expect from these influential contributions. Our empirical evaluation of the roll call patterns between 1994 and 1998 reveals furthermore that the probability of voting against the Council majority varies greatly between the Council members. Large countries are significantly more inclined to vote `no' than are their smaller counterparts. The multidimensional scaling analysis of voting coalitions indicates a north-south division in the Council.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikko Mattila & Jan-Erik Lane, 2001. "Why Unanimity in the Council?," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 31-52, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:31-52
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116501002001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Vaubel, 2008. "The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 435-465, December.
    2. Muhlbock, Monika & Tosun, Jale, 2015. "Deciding over controversial issues: Voting behavior in the Council and the European Parliament on genetically modified organisms," GMCC-15: Seventh GMCC, November 17-20, 2015, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 211480, International Conference on Coexistence between Genetically Modified (GM) and non-GM based Agricultural Supply Chains (GMCC).

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