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Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement

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  • Powell, Robert

Abstract

Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state's demands are unlimited, then the declining state prefers fighting. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war. This situation creates a trade-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions.

Suggested Citation

  • Powell, Robert, 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 749-764, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:04:p:749-764_20
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli & Dominic Rohner, 2015. "The Geography of Interstate Resource Wars," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 267-315.
    2. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010. "Peace agreements without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
    3. Alastair Smith, 1998. "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 301-320, June.
    4. Timothy M Peterson, 2011. "Third-party trade, political similarity, and dyadic conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(2), pages 185-200, March.
    5. Amy Yuen, 2009. "Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 745-773, October.
    6. Kyle Haynes & Brandon K. Yoder, 2024. "Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 26-46, January.
    7. Hee Min Kim & Jun Choi, 2002. "Uncertainty in foreign policy making: A Bayesian game analysis of Korea," Global Economic Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 25-40.
    8. Sivanathan, Niro & Pillutla, Madan M. & Keith Murnighan, J., 2008. "Power gained, power lost," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 135-146, March.
    9. Frank C. Zagare & D. Marc Kolgour, 1998. "Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 59-87, January.
    10. Morelli, Massimo & Rohner, Dominic, 2015. "Resource concentration and civil wars," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 32-47.
    11. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 233-257, December.
    12. Brian Efird & Gaspare M. Genna, 2002. "Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 267-295, September.
    13. Francesco Caselli, 2012. "The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars," 2012 Meeting Papers 1174, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. M. Christian Lehmann, 2020. "Aiding refugees, aiding peace?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1687-1704, September.

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