IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v80y1986i04p1249-1270_18.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System

Author

Listed:
  • Scholz, John T.
  • Wei, Feng Heng

Abstract

Federal agencies integrate federal, state, and local political demands at the operational level of service delivery. They balance conflicting political demands and task requirements as they attempt to develop feasible enforcement routines capable of attracting support and resources in multiple arenas without undermining central support for budgetary resources and statutory authority. Our regression analysis of annual enforcement data from 1976 through 1983 for all 50 states indicates that even the relatively isolated enforcement procedures of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration respond significantly to state-level political and task differences. Enforcement activities responded most consistently to daily enforcement contacts with interest groups. State differences in task conditions—particularly workplace accident and unemployment rates—also elicited instrumental responses, while differences in the party and ideology of elected officials elicited more symbolic actions. State agencies, with their smaller size and greater flexibility, were even more responsive than the federal agency to political and task differences. This integrative function of bureaucracy needs further attention in democratic theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Scholz, John T. & Wei, Feng Heng, 1986. "Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1249-1270, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1249-1270_18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400185090/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. George Tsebelis, 1991. "The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 81-101, January.
    2. Lael R. Keiser & Peter R. Mueser & Seung‐Whan Choi, 2004. "Race, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reform," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 314-327, April.
    3. Hutchinson, Emma & Kennedy, Peter W., 2008. "State enforcement of federal standards: Implications for interstate pollution," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 316-344, August.
    4. Bellò, Benedetta & Spano, Alessandro, 2015. "Governing the purple zone: How politicians influence public managers," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 354-365.
    5. William D. Schreckhise & Daniel E. Chand, 2023. "Local implementation of U.S. federal immigration programs: context, control, and the problems of intergovernmental implementation," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 56(4), pages 797-823, December.
    6. Hernán Herrera-Echeverri & Jerry Haar & Alexander Arrieta Jiménez & Manuel Araújo Zapata, 2015. "Devaluation, Competitiveness And New Business Formation In Emerging Countries," Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship (JDE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-22, September.
    7. Xiao Tang & Zhengwen Liu & Hongtao Yi, 2016. "Mandatory Targets and Environmental Performance: An Analysis Based on Regression Discontinuity Design," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-16, September.
    8. Kathryn Harrison, 1995. "Is cooperation the answer? Canadian environmental enforcement in comparative context," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 221-244.
    9. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.
    10. Andrew B. Whitford, 2007. "Competing Explanations for Bureaucratic Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 219-247, July.
    11. Peter J. May, 1993. "Mandate design and implementation: Enhancing implementation efforts and shaping regulatory styles," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(4), pages 634-663.
    12. Susumu Shikano & Michael F Stoffel & Markus Tepe, 2017. "Information accuracy in legislative oversight: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(2), pages 226-254, May.
    13. Juergen Jung & Michael D. Makowsky, 2012. "Regulatory Enforcement, Politics, and Institutional Distance: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010," Working Papers 2012-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2013.
    14. Juergen Jung & Michael Makowsky, 2014. "The determinants of federal and state enforcement of workplace safety regulations: OSHA inspections 1990–2010," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 1-33, February.
    15. Benjamin Van Rooij & Gerald E. Fryxell & Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo & Wei Wang, 2013. "From support to pressure: The dynamics of social and governmental influences on environmental law enforcement in Guangzhou City, China," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(3), pages 321-347, September.
    16. Helland, Eric, 1998. "The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 242-261, May.
    17. Andrew B. Whitford, 2002. "Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 167-193, April.
    18. David M. Konisky, 2009. "Inequities in enforcement? Environmental justice and government performance," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(1), pages 102-121.
    19. Dorothy M. Daley & Megan Mullin & Meghan E. Rubado, 2014. "State Agency Discretion in a Delegated Federal Program: Evidence from Drinking Water Investment," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 44(4), pages 564-586.
    20. Earl, Anna & Michailova, Snejina, 2021. "Home governments and MNEs in Russia: Relationships and MNE external legitimacy," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(2).
    21. Laura I. Langbein, 1994. "Estimating the Impact of Regulatory Program Enforcement," Evaluation Review, , vol. 18(5), pages 543-573, October.
    22. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald Erick Fryxell, 2005. "Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in China: An Empirical Study in Guangzhou," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 558-588.
    23. Doo-Rae Kim, 2007. "Federal Institutions, State Agency Bias, and Unequal Bureaucratic Responsiveness in the U.S. OSHA Enforcement," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 21-32, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:80:y:1986:i:04:p:1249-1270_18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.