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An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics

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  • Bendor, Jonathan
  • Moe, Terry M.

Abstract

In this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics. It departs from standard neoclassical approaches, notably those of Niskanen (1971) and Peltzman (1976), in several important respects. First our approach explicitly models a system of three-way interaction among bureaus, politicians, and interest groups. Second, it allows for institutional features of each type of participant. Third, it is a model of dynamic process. Fourth, participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing. Fifth, participants are only minimally informed. The result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior, very much in the spirit of Simon's (1947) behavioral tradition, that offers a new perspective on political control, bureaucratic power, and the “intelligence of democracy.”

Suggested Citation

  • Bendor, Jonathan & Moe, Terry M., 1985. "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 755-774, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:03:p:755-774_22
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    Cited by:

    1. Bidhya Bowornwathana & Ora-orn Poocharoen, 2010. "Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 303-321, December.
    2. Davide Luca, 2017. "Boon or bane for development? Turkey’s central state bureaucracy and the management of public investment," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 35(6), pages 939-957, September.
    3. Marta Migliorati, 2020. "The Post‐agencification Stage between Reforms and Crises. A Comparative Assessment of EU agencies' Budgetary Development," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(6), pages 1393-1412, November.
    4. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 1999. "Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 29-60, April.
    5. Paul A. Kowert & Margaret G. Hermann, 1997. "Who Takes Risks?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 611-637, October.
    6. Rountree, Valerie, 2019. "Nevada's experience with the Renewable Portfolio Standard," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 279-291.
    7. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    8. Christopher Hood, 1991. "Stabilization and Cutbacks," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(1), pages 37-63, January.
    9. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    10. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, 2009. "Divided government and US federal rulemaking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(2), pages 128-144, June.
    11. Gervan Fearon, 2001. "Endogenous public sector budgeting: to centralize or not?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(2), pages 504-524, May.
    12. Nuria Boch Roca & Javier Suárez Pandiello, 2015. "Politics and Finance in Spanish Municipalities," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 212(1), pages 51-66, March.
    13. Cusack, Thomas R., 1987. "Public expenditure decision making: A comparative analysis," Discussion Papers, various Research Units FGG dp 87-1, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    14. Uusikylä, Petri, 1996. "The Politics of Cutback Management: A Case Study of Interorganizational Relations and Influence Structures During a Local Government Retrenchment Process," MPIfG Discussion Paper 96/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    15. Olson, Mary K, 1999. "Agency Rulemaking, Political Influences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 573-601, October.
    16. Davide Luca, 2016. "Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain policy effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s central management of public investment," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 109, European Institute, LSE.
    17. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.
    18. Shaheen Naseer, 2019. "Public Spending, Quality of Bureaucracy and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Analysis," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(2), pages 203-221.

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