The New Trinity: The Political Consequences of WTO, PNTR, and the Internet in China
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- Paul F. Whiteley (ed.), 1998. "Economic Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 996.
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Cited by:
- Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang & Yu, Linhui, 2011. "Agglomeration and Markup," MPRA Paper 38974, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised May 2012.
- Alicia Garcia Herrero & Daniel Santabarbara Garcia, 2004. "Where Is The Chinese Banking System Going With The Ongoing Reform?," Macroeconomics 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mr. Anoop Singh & Mr. Martin D. Cerisola, 2006. "Sustaining Latin America's Resurgence: Some Historical Perspectives," IMF Working Papers 2006/252, International Monetary Fund.
- Beoy Kui Ng, 2007. "Banking Reform in China: An Assessment in Macroeconomic Perspective," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 0707, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
- Bayraktar, Nihal & Yan Wang, 2004. "Foreign bank entry, performance of domestic banks, and sequence of financial liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3416, The World Bank.
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JEL classification:
- R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
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