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Cuotas de pesca y libre competencia: consideraciones para la nueva ley de pesca

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  • Juan Pablo, Montero

    (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía)

Abstract

A new fishing law is to enter into effect by the end of 2012 to replace the actual law 19,713. Several analysts have argued that the new law must correct, among other things, for the limited competition and lack of new entry in the sector. Using economic theory and evidence from fisheries in Chile’s central-south zone, the objective of this paper is to document precisely the contrary. The latter has two implications for the drafting of the new law. The first is that the use of auctions to allocate quotas should only be justified on distribution grounds and not on efficiency grounds; and second, that there are no efficiency losses from allocating quotas in perpetuity provided that they are easily transferable.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo, Montero, 2012. "Cuotas de pesca y libre competencia: consideraciones para la nueva ley de pesca," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(127), pages 1-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2012:i:127:p:1-51
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fishing quotas; auctions; competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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