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Securite Routiere: Efficacite, Subvention et Reglementation

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  • Boyer, M.
  • Dionne, G.

Abstract

In this paper, we present an economic analysis of road safety emphasizing market failures due to externalities and moral hazard. We also examine governmental actions such as taxes and subsidies and regulation which may reduce inefficiencies. Dans cet article nous présentons une analyse économique de la sécurité routière en mettant l’accent sur les inefficacités engendrées par les externalités et le risque moral. Nous abordons également des mécanismes susceptibles de contrer les inefficacités tels les taxes et subsides et la réglementation gouvernementale.
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Suggested Citation

  • Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1983. "Securite Routiere: Efficacite, Subvention et Reglementation," Cahiers de recherche 8317, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:8317
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(1), pages 143-156.
    2. Dionne, G., 1980. "Moral Hazard and State-Dependent Utility Function," Cahiers de recherche 8053, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    3. DEHEZ, Pierre & DREZE, Jacques H., 1984. "State-dependent utility, the demand for insurance and the value of safety," LIDAM Reprints CORE 560, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1983. "Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss: Their Impact on Risk," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(3), pages 411-419, August.
    5. Boyer, M. & Mackay, E., 1981. "The Concept of Adequate Information: Market Failures and Their Corrections," Cahiers de recherche 8126, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    6. Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1983. "The Riskiness of Equivalent Governmental Policies," Cahiers de recherche 8319, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    7. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
    8. Richard J. Arnould & Henry Grabowski, 1981. "Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of Market Failure," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 27-48, Spring.
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