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Riskante Risikokontrolle

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Brendel
  • Jakob Eberl
  • Christopher Weber

Abstract

Die quantitative und qualitative Erweiterung notenbankfähiger Sicherheiten durch das Eurosystem seit Beginn der Finanzkrise war die Grundlage für eine stark ausgedehnte Liquiditätsversorgung der Finanzmärkte durch das Eurosystem. Die Kontrolle der mit dieser Liquiditätsbereitstellung verbundenen Risiken hat daher in den letzten Jahren zusätzlich an Bedeutung gewonnen. Matthias Brendel, Finanzjournalist, Jakob Eberl und Christopher Weber, Center for Economic Studies an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, diskutieren anhand der Umsetzung im Eurosystem, wie den Risiken durch die Definition notenbankfähiger Sicherheiten und die Festlegung von Bewertungsabschlägen begegnet werden kann. Der von der Europäischen Zentralbank definierte Risikokontrollrahmen lässt dabei allerdings Spielräume in der Beurteilung von Wertpapieren offen, die zu einer Schwächung der Risikokontrolle führen und Ursprung neuer Risiken sein können. Fünf Empfehlungen zur effektiven Risikominimierung werden auf Basis der Analyse des Risikokontrollrahmens und unter Berücksichtigung dessen dezentraler Umsetzung im Eurosystem gegeben.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Brendel & Jakob Eberl & Christopher Weber, 2015. "Riskante Risikokontrolle," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 68(14), pages 41-49, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:68:y:2015:i:14:p:41-49
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, . "The New Systems Competition: YRJÖ Jahnsson Lectures," Monographs in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 19614, November.
    2. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2017. "The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198791447.
    3. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2013. "The Changing Collateral Space," IMF Working Papers 2013/025, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bindseil, Ulrich & Corsi, Marco & Sahel, Benjamin & Visser, Ad, 2017. "The Eurosystem collateral framework explained," Occasional Paper Series 189, European Central Bank.
    2. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risiko; Kreditwürdigkeit; Geldpolitik; Eurozone;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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