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Regulierungsmodelle für die öffentliche Wasserversorgung und ihre Wettbewerbseffekte

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  • Johann Wackerbauer

Abstract

Angesichts der voranschreitenden Liberalisierungsbestrebungen und einer zunehmenden Internationalisierung der Wasserwirtschaft stellt sich die Frage, wie sich eine Änderung des Ordnungsrahmens in Deutschland auf die Marktstruktur und die Angebotsbedingungen auswirken würde. Die Wasserunternehmen in Deutschland haben in der Vergangenheit jährlich ca. 2,5 Mrd. € in einen hohen technischen Standard investiert, was hohe Kostenzuwächse und Preiserhöhungen zur Folge hatte. In den kommunalen Wasserbetrieben wird daher ein hohes Rationalisierungspotential vermutet. Die Frage nach der betriebswirtschaftlichen Effizienz und der Beteiligung privater Anbieter an den Wasserversorgungsunternehmen gewinnt damit zunehmend an Bedeutung. In diesem Beitrag wird die Organisation der Wasserwirtschaft in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern beschrieben sowie die aus einer Liberalisierung der Wasserversorgung zu erwartenden Wirkungen auf die Wettbewerbssituation in Deutschland diskutiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Johann Wackerbauer, 2003. "Regulierungsmodelle für die öffentliche Wasserversorgung und ihre Wettbewerbseffekte," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 56(21), pages 9-16, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:56:y:2003:i:21:p:9-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cowan, Simon, 1997. "Competition in the Water Industry," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 13(1), pages 83-92, Spring.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Müller, 2015. "Welfare Effects of Water Pricing in Germany," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(04), pages 1-25, December.
    2. Hesse, Mario & Lenk, Thomas & Rottmann, Oliver, 2009. "Privatisierung der Wasserversorgung aus ordnungstheoretischer Perspektive," Arbeitspapiere des Lehrstuhls Finanzwissenschaft 40, University of Leipzig, Institute of Public Finance and Public Management.
    3. Ursula Triebswetter & Johann Wackerbauer, 2010. "Water - a substantial location factor for the Bavarian economy," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 47.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wasserversorgung; Wettbewerb; Deutschland; Frankreich; Wasserwirtschaft; Vergleich; EU-Staaten; Privatisierung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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