Shareholder Welfare in Minority Freeze-Out Bids: Are Legal Protections Sufficient? Evidence from the U.S. Market
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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