Crony Capitalism
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Cited by:
- Sami Fethi & Hatice Imamoglu, 2021. "The impact of rent‐seeking on economic growth in the six geographic regions: Evidence from static and dynamic panel data analysis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5349-5362, October.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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