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Inheritance Rights and Economic Results in Historical Plan

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  • Stoyan Shalamanov

    (Sofia University, Bulgaria)

Abstract

It has been shown in economic theory that the emergence of new market industries leads to accelerated economic growth. Economic growth in turn induces an increase in income inequality. Income inequality in the long run produces a greater degree of wealth inequality. Such processes have been observed in modern market economies with particular intensity since the end of the twentieth century. High wealth inequality produces various forms of inefficiency. This calls for new approaches to reducing wealth inequality that do not distort the efficiency of the free market. Inheritance rights are a type of property rights. Their consideration is part of property rights theory and institutional economic theory. They have the potential to offer effective solutions to problems. This paper examines the development of inheritance rights in Bulgaria over the years and the political and socio-economic changes associated with them. In the periods under review, no significant differences in economic terms can be discerned with respect to the rights themselves and the related laws of succession. The first period (1978-1944) was characterised by attempts by the State to shake off the culture and traditions (customary law) that were strongly rooted in the population with regard to the transmission of inheritance, in order to create a more modern and adequate legal basis for the new economic and social realities. This has been difficult to achieve and several legislative changes in the Succession Act of 1896 and 1906 retreated from these aspirations. During the years of the two Succession Acts of 1890 and 1949, hardly any differences were found with regard to the acceptance of property by inventory and liability to the heir's creditors. The differences as to the disposable part of the estate are small - in the old 1890 Act it was possible to reach 2/3 disposable part, in the new one up to 1/2., indicating that the old one gave a little more freedom to heirs in certain circumstances. The significant differences for economics, affecting inheritance rights of property, come mainly from other laws regulating property and taxes on property and its transactions. Through these laws, in the period 1944-1989, the rights to transmit inheritance were severely restricted, especially if larger inheritances were involved. This was achieved through the restrictions on personal and family immovable property set out in the 1973 Citizens' Property Act and the introduction of high tax rates on larger inheritances (the 1951 Inheritance Tax Act). The changes since 1989 have not led to any significant differences in inheritance rights per se, but rather in improving both the economic and legal possibilities to transfer large inheritances without hindrance.

Suggested Citation

  • Stoyan Shalamanov, 2024. "Inheritance Rights and Economic Results in Historical Plan," Proceedings of the Centre for Economic History Research, Centre for Economic History Research, vol. 9, pages 245-255, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ceh:journl:y:2024:v:9:p:245-255
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timur Kuran, 2011. "The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9273.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    History of inheritance law; Institutional economic theory; Property rights theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K15 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Civil Law; Common Law

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