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Agenzie di collocamento ed effetti sulle frizioni nel mercato del lavoro

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  • Luigi Bonaventura

Abstract

Questo lavoro analizza gli effetti delle agenzie di collocamento sul mercato del lavoro. Il numero di agenzie in uenza l'e cienza dei meccanismi di incontro tra domanda ed offerta di lavoro. Si introducono le agenzie in un modello di equilibrio di disoccupazione alla Pissarides e si analizzano gli effetti sull'occupazione al variare del numero di agenzie. Si mostra che in presenza di asimmetrie informative, è preferibile avere una sola agenzia (monopolista), oppure è possibile aumentare l'e cienza solo con un numero elevato di agenzie.
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Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Bonaventura, 2012. "Agenzie di collocamento ed effetti sulle frizioni nel mercato del lavoro," Economia & lavoro, Carocci editore, issue 2, pages 1-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:caq:j950ix:doi:10.7384/70993:y:2012:i:2:p:95
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    2. Albrecht, James W. & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan B., 2003. "Matching with multiple applications," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 67-70, January.
    3. Stefano Maria Iacus & Giuseppe Porro, 2002. "Il lavoro interinale in Italia: uno sguardo all'offerta," Departmental Working Papers 2002-26, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    4. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1994. "Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 417-434.
    5. Andrea Ichino & Fabrizia Mealli & Tommaso Nannicini, 2005. "Temporary Work Agencies in Italy: A Springboard Toward Permanent Employment?," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 64(1), pages 1-27, September.
    6. James Albrecht, Pieter Gautier, & Susan Vroman, 2003. "Matching with Multiple Applications: The Limiting Case," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-25, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Andrea Montanino & Paolo Sestito, 2003. "Le molte funzioni del lavoro interinale in Italia: da strumento di flessibilità a contratto di prova," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 93(2), pages 115-148, March-Apr.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    This article analyses the effects of the number of employment agencies on the labour market. The number of agencies affects the efficiency of the mechanisms to match labour market demand and supply. The agencies are inserted into a Pissarides equilibrium unemployment model and the effects on employment with variation in the number of agencies are analysed. It is demonstrated that with incomplete information it is preferable to have one single agency (monopolist); alternatively; efficiency can be enhanced only with a very high number of agencies.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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