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Les salariés du secteur associatif sont-ils davantage intrinsèquement motivés que ceux du secteur privé ?

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  • Mathieu Narcy

Abstract

The nonprofit sector differs from the for-profit sector both in its more socially-oriented goals and in its differententrepreneurship methods. It may therefore appeal to workers whose job choices are guided by non-monetaryconsiderations. Nonprofit organizations may thus attract more intrinsically motivated workers than for-profit firms. Ourempirical analysis uses the French Labor-Force Survey. The results show that nonprofit workers ? unlike for-profitworkers ? deliberately agree to work for lower wages than they could have obtained in the for-profit sector. These resultstherefore suggest that nonprofit workers report higher levels of intrinsic motivation than their for-profit counterparts.

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  • Mathieu Narcy, 2009. "Les salariés du secteur associatif sont-ils davantage intrinsèquement motivés que ceux du secteur privé ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 81-99.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_188_0081
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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Nirello & Lionel Prouteau, 2015. "Quels écarts de rémunérations entre salariés associatifs et salariés du secteur privé ?," Working Papers hal-01178214, HAL.
    2. Salah Ould Younes, 2014. "La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14055, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Salah Ould Younes, 2014. "La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne," Post-Print halshs-01025110, HAL.
    4. Salah Ould Younes, 2014. "La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01025110, HAL.

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