IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rneart/v11y2012i4p1-35n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?

Author

Listed:
  • Bejarano Hernan D.

    (Penn State)

  • Clifner Lance

    (August Systems Inc.)

  • Johnston Carl

    (George Mason University)

  • Rassenti Stephen

    (Chapman University)

  • Smith Vernon L.

    (Chapman University)

Abstract

Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bejarano Hernan D. & Clifner Lance & Johnston Carl & Rassenti Stephen & Smith Vernon L., 2012. "Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators Worry?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-35, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:4:p:1-35:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1391
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1391
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/1446-9022.1391?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis‐Christou & Arthur Schram, 2008. "Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 192-214, January.
    2. James B. Bushnell & Erin T. Mansur & Celeste Saravia, 2008. "Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 237-266, March.
    3. Kira R. Fabrizio & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine D. Wolfram, 2007. "Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1250-1277, September.
    4. Paul L. Joskow, 2008. "Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization," The Energy Journal, , vol. 29(2_suppl), pages 9-42, December.
    5. John Kwoka, 2008. "Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector: A Review of Recent Studies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 32(3), pages 165-196, May.
    6. Jeff Lien, 2008. "Electricity Restructuring: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and What is Next," EAG Competition Advocacy Papers 200804, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    7. repec:cto:journl:v:21:y:2002:i:3:p:515-544 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Jeff Lien, 2008. "Electricity Restructuring: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and What is Next," EAG Discussions Papers 200804, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mark A. Jamison, 2011. "Liberalization and Regulation of Telecoms, Electricity, and Gas in the United States," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 21, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Tin Cheuk Leung & Kwok Ping Ping & Kevin K. Tsui, 2019. "What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-32, August.
    3. David P. Brown & Derek E. H. Olmstead, 2017. "Measuring market power and the efficiency of Alberta's restructured electricity market: An energy-only market design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(3), pages 838-870, August.
    4. Xuejuan Su, 2015. "Have customers benefited from electricity retail competition?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 146-182, April.
    5. Hyman, Leonard S., 2010. "Restructuring electricity policy and financial models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 751-757, July.
    6. Bowen, William M. & Hill, Edward (Ned) & Thomas, Andrew & Liu, Ruoran & Henning, Mark, 2023. "Consumer price effects of deregulated electric generation markets: The case of Ohio and the midwestern United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    7. Russell Pittman & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, 2008. "Electricity Restructuring in China: The Elusive Quest for Competition," EAG Discussions Papers 200805, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    8. Rassenti, Stephen, 2009. "The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence," UC3M Working papers. Economics we092616, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    9. Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert, 2015. "Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 236-266.
    10. Nancy L. Rose, 2014. "Learning from the Past: Insights for the Regulation of Economic Activity," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 1-23, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. David P. Brown & Andrew Eckert, 2018. "Analyzing the Impact of Electricity Market Structure Changes and Mergers: The Importance of Forward Commitments," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-137, February.
    12. Ibarra-Yunez, Alejandro, 2015. "Energy reform in Mexico: Imperfect unbundling in the electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 19-27.
    13. Browne, Oliver & Poletti, Stephen & Young, David, 2015. "How does market power affect the impact of large scale wind investment in 'energy only' wholesale electricity markets?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 17-27.
    14. Carlos Suarez, 2021. "Private management and strategic bidding behavior in electricity markets: Evidence from Colombia," IREA Working Papers 202102, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jan 2021.
    15. Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2009. "Market power in the Nordic electricity wholesale market: A survey of the empirical evidence," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 3681-3692, September.
    16. Willems, Bert & Rumiantseva, Ina & Weigt, Hannes, 2009. "Cournot versus Supply Functions: What does the data tell us?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 38-47, January.
    17. Dressler, Luisa, 2016. "Support schemes for renewable electricity in the European Union: Producer strategies and competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 186-196.
    18. Doumpos, Michalis & Andriosopoulos, Kostas & Galariotis, Emilios & Makridou, Georgia & Zopounidis, Constantin, 2017. "Corporate failure prediction in the European energy sector: A multicriteria approach and the effect of country characteristics," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 262(1), pages 347-360.
    19. Bernstein, David H. & Parmeter, Christopher F., 2019. "Returns to scale in electricity generation: Replicated and revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 4-15.
    20. Linn, Joshua & Muehlenbachs, Lucija, 2018. "The heterogeneous impacts of low natural gas prices on consumers and the environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-28.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:4:p:1-35:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.