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Evolutionary Theories in Law and Economics and Their Use for Comparative Legal Theory

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  • von Wangenheim Georg

    (University of Kassel)

Abstract

Evolutionary Law and Economics explains how law evolves in possibly path dependent ways. The theory therefore seems apt to help comparative legal theory in understanding and evaluating legal variation across jurisdictions. This paper reviews evolutionary approaches in Law and Economics to study in a more precise way whether and how different strands of the approach may be useful for the comparative lawyer.

Suggested Citation

  • von Wangenheim Georg, 2011. "Evolutionary Theories in Law and Economics and Their Use for Comparative Legal Theory," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 737-765, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:7:y:2011:i:3:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1571
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    Cited by:

    1. Du Laing Bart & De Coninck Julie, 2011. "Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Approaches to (Comparative) Law: Integrating Theoretical Perspectives," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 653-658, December.
    2. Du Laing Bart, 2011. "Bio-Legal History, Dual Inheritance Theory and Naturalistic Comparative Law: On Content and Context Biases in Legal Evolution," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 685-709, December.

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