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Criminal Associations with Bargaining and Build Frictions

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  • Engelhardt Bryan

    (College of the Holy Cross)

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect criminal associations when retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities. Given the illicit nature of crime, a non-competitive market is considered where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions, and increase market activity or crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Engelhardt Bryan, 2010. "Criminal Associations with Bargaining and Build Frictions," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 303-323, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:6:y:2010:i:2:n:8
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1496
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.

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