Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliberates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1334
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld, 1976. "A note on clique avoidance in repeated jury selection from among a fixed pool of jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 145-150, June.
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- Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
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Cited by:
- Francisco Pino & Jordi Vidal-Robert, "undated".
"Habemus Papam? Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States,"
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wp492, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
- Pino, Francisco J. & Vidal-Robert, Jordi, 2014. "Habemus Papam? Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 189, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Francisco Pino & Jordi Vidal-Robert, 2014. "Habemus Papam ?Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-27, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pino, Francisco J. & Vidal-Robert, Jordi, 2020. "Habemus Papam? Polarization and Conflict in the Papal States," IZA Discussion Papers 12911, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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