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Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages

Author

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  • Cooper David

    (20/20 Business Vision)

  • Tomlin Jonathan T

    (LECG)

Abstract

The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals placed federal judges in the role of "gatekeepers" empowered to screen out unreliable expert testimony. We address the impact of "gatekeeping" on the accuracy of expert testimony and, consequently, on the accuracy of jury decision-making through a simple game-theoretic model. We find that a sufficiently high probability of excluding biased testimony is essential for accurate damages awards. Otherwise, asymmetries in the judicial process lead to damages awards that are either insufficient or excessive relative to "true" damages. We explain the conditions leading to each outcome and demonstrate that excessive damages awards are more likely to occur in complex cases. We also discuss the role of a court-appointed technical advisor and briefly explain how the "threat" alone that a judge will use such an advisor can deter biased testimony and lead to an accurate expected damages award.

Suggested Citation

  • Cooper David & Tomlin Jonathan T, 2008. "Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 213-231, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:1:n:11
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
    2. Wenli Li & Ishani Tewari & Michelle J. White, 2019. "Using Bankruptcy to Reduce Foreclosures: Does Strip-Down of Mortgages Affect the Mortgage Market?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 59-87, February.
    3. Wenli Li & Ishani Tewari & Michelle White, 2014. "Using Bankruptcy to Reduce Foreclosures," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 31-38, October.
    4. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126471 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Wenli Li & Ishani Tewari & Michelle White, 2014. "Using Bankruptcy to Reduce Foreclosures," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(03), pages 31-38, October.

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