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Paramilitaries and Electoral Support

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  • Tribín Ana María

    (Brown University – Economics, Brown University, Economics Robinson Hall, Providence, RI 02912, USA)

Abstract

This paper examines the tactical redistribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking reelection in a country in the midst of an armed conflict. The illegal armed groups in Colombia are known to have extreme ideological beliefs; the guerrillas lean far to the Left, and the paramilitaries, far to the Right. The model and the empirical results show that regions with powerful groups who have a defined political ideology are less strategically attractive when it comes to the distribution of government resources. Nevertheless, when an illegal group can coerce voters to support a candidate and decide between candidates, as in the case of paramilitaries, redistribution is targeted to the illegal group. As a natural experiment, this paper empirically tests the effect of a policy to demobilize and reintegrate the members of paramilitary groups into society, so as to show the decisions on redistribution change when paramilitary forces do not exercise control in the municipalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Tribín Ana María, 2015. "Paramilitaries and Electoral Support," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 191-216, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:21:y:2015:i:2:p:191-216:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2014-0050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    2. Ibáñez, Ana Mari­a & Vélez, Carlos Eduardo, 2008. "Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 659-676, April.
    3. Vivi Alatas & Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Benjamin A. Olken & Ririn Purnamasari & Matthew Wai-Poi, 2019. "Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 109, pages 334-339, May.
    4. Razvan Vlaicu, 2008. "Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 371-406, October.
    5. Fabio S�nchez & Mar�a del Mar Palau, 2006. "Conflict, Decentralisation and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004," HiCN Working Papers 14, Households in Conflict Network.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Tristan Reed & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone," NBER Working Papers 18691, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Rafael J. Santos, 2013. "The Monopoly Of Violence: Evidence From Colombia," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11, pages 5-44, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tribin, Ana, 2020. "Chasing votes with the public budget," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Clark Granger-Castaño & Yurany Hernández-Turca & Carlos Murcia-Bustos & Lisseth Yaya-Garzón, 2018. "Ciclo político en las finanzas de los gobiernos regionales de Colombia 1998-2014," Borradores de Economia 1044, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    redistribution; elections; public goods; cash transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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