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Staatliche Bankenaufsicht – eine effiziente Institution?

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  • Knorr Andreas

Abstract

Market failure due to widespread asymmetric information is the economic justification for state regulation of banks, the main objective of which is to prevent systemwide banking crises. The author argues, however, that government regulations themselves have a highly destabilizing effect on the banking industry. First, they give rise to significant moral hazard problems. Second, by restricting competition among rules, they stunt the search for more efficient and effective alternative institutional arrangements, especially market-based ones. Finally, government supervision of banks is an inappropriate measure against the very causes of the banking sector’s occasional instability.

Suggested Citation

  • Knorr Andreas, 1999. "Staatliche Bankenaufsicht – eine effiziente Institution?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 50(1), pages 345-370, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:50:y:1999:i:1:p:345-370:n:21
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-1999-0121
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    References listed on IDEAS

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