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Interessenverbände im politischen Prozeß - Einflußnahme und Möglichkeiten der Begrenzung

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  • Daumann Frank

Abstract

Different factors favor the influence of interest groups to get non competitive gains. Both, deficits in the political order and little competition between different interest groups can be considered as the decisive causes. To restrict the influence of interest groups a vast array of measures has been discussed. The author of this paper suggests to combine the sunset legislation approach with measures to increase the transparency on distributional effects of the legislation. This solution would reduce the period of time during which non competitive gains can be realized and would lead to more competition between the interest groups. It would also reduce the negative economic consequences that result from interest groups' influence on the political process.

Suggested Citation

  • Daumann Frank, 1999. "Interessenverbände im politischen Prozeß - Einflußnahme und Möglichkeiten der Begrenzung," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 50(1), pages 171-206, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:50:y:1999:i:1:p:171-206:n:15
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-1999-0115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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