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The Sugar-Pie Game: The Case of Non-Conforming Expectations

Author

Listed:
  • Mullat Joseph E.

    (Former docent at the Faculty of Economics, Tallinn, Technical University, Estonia)

Abstract

Playing a bargaining game, the players with non-conforming expectations were trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. The first player, who was not very keen on sweets, placed an emphasis on quality. In contrast, for the second player, all sweet options, whatever they might be, were open. Thus, this paper aims to determine the negotiating power of the first player, if equal division of the pie was desirable, i. e., both players aimed to get 1/2 of the available sweets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mullat Joseph E., 2014. "The Sugar-Pie Game: The Case of Non-Conforming Expectations," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1-2), pages 27-31, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:maecol:v:2:y:2014:i:1-2:p:5:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0017
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph E. Mullat, 2016. "The Left- and Right-Wing Political Power Design: The Dilemma of Welfare Policy with Low-Income Relief," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 5(1), pages 1-33, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; bargaining power; non-conforming expectations; Game theory; bargaining power; non-conforming expectations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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