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Economic Constitutions in the Developing World

Author

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  • Bui Ngoc Son

    (Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, New Territories, Hong Kong)

Abstract

A constitution is not purely a legal document. Neither is it only a political manifesto. It is also an economic charter which expresses a country’s economic hopes and aspirations, and regulates economic activities of constitutional stakeholders. This paper adumbrates a framework to understand the economic constitutions in the developing world. It explores the direct concept of an economic constitution, which refers to a constitution deriving from an overarching economic rationale, created or reformed through a process operating as a platform for different sectors of the society to deliberate economic questions, and consequently addressing national economic identity, principles, rights, and structural institutions in its substantive contents. Economic constitutions have two main functions: expressive and regulative. The tentative explanatory factors that may account for similarities and differences in the economic constitutions in developing countries include: the pre-existing economic conditions, the institutional setting, the national ideology, and the impact of globalization. The findings of this study offer systematic implications for the study of developing countries actively pursuing constitutional and economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Bui Ngoc Son, 2019. "Economic Constitutions in the Developing World," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 669-690, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:lawdev:v:12:y:2019:i:3:p:669-690:n:9
    DOI: 10.1515/ldr-2019-0048
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