IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/jeehcn/v11y2001i4n5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deregulation vs. Re-regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Schwarz Jiri

    (Liberalni Institut, Prague)

Abstract

The classical liberal approach to deregulation is based on the consecutive elimination of state regulatory activities and their substitution by competitive market structure. Increasing competition accompanied with decreasing arbitrary state agencies' interventions will undoubtedly cultivate the behaviour of market agents and bring benefits to consumers.The classical liberal approach to deregulation is incompatible with the EU deregulation model, which in case of network industries is still based on the permanent existence of regulatory agencies, Third-Party-Access, public service liability, centralized control of investments and the negative reciprocity. The adoption of these principals will at least delay deregulation process in transition economies but will likely preserve the cartel structure on the utility markets.Economics of regulation and implicitly economics of deregulation is a product of the Chicago School of Economics. Since current "deregulation process" leads to tighter regulation, the adequate term for it should be the reregulation.L'approche libérale classique de la réglementation repose sur l'élimination de la réglementation étatique et leur substitution par des structures marchandes concurrentielles. Une concurrence accrue et une diminution des interventions arbitraires de l'état ne pourront que modifier le comportement des agents sur le marché et engendrer des bénéfices pour les consommateurs.L'approche de la déréglementation du libéralisme classique est incompatible avec le modèle de déréglementation de l'Union Européenne : dans le cas des industries en réseau, ce dernier demeure fondé sur l'existence continue d'agences de réglementation, la responsabilité du service public, le contrôle centralisé des investissements et la réciprocité négative. L'adoption de ces principes aura pour effet au moins de retarder le processus de déréglementation dans les économies en transition et probablement aussi de préserver la structure cartellisée des marchés de services publics.L'économie de la réglementation, et par implication, l'économie de la déréglementation est une contribution émanant de l'Ecole d'Economie de Chicago. Parce que les "processus de déréglemen- tation" en vigueur induisent des réglementations plus drastiques, l'expression appropriée devrait plutôt être la re-réglementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Schwarz Jiri, 2001. "Deregulation vs. Re-regulation," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 11(4), pages 1-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1034
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1034
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1145-6396.1034?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. repec:cto:journl:v:20:y:2001:i:3:p:327-358 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Edward Stringham & Peter Boettke, 2006. "The failings of legal centralism for helping stock markets in transition," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2006(1), pages 22-34.
    2. Ladislava Grochova & Tomas Otahal, 2011. "Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-13, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    3. Hahn Robert, 2010. "Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    4. Grant H. Lewis, 2017. "Effects of federal socioeconomic contracting preferences," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 763-783, December.
    5. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    6. Robert Gmeiner, 2019. "Regulatory capture in the US petroleum refining industry," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 46(4), pages 459-498, December.
    7. Koichi Hamada & Asahi Noguchi, 2005. "The Role of Preconceived Ideas in Macroeconomic Policy: Japan's Experiences in the Two Deflationary Periods," Working Papers 908, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    8. David Slattery & Joseph G. Nellis, 2011. "Rethinking the Role of Regulation in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis: The Case of the UK," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(3), pages 407-423, September.
    9. Ando, Amy, 1998. "Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-43-rev, Resources for the Future.
    10. Maciej Czaplewski, 2015. "Oddziaływanie regulacyjne Unii Europejskiej na rynek usług telekomunikacyjnych," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 5, pages 65-87.
    11. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8527 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, June.
    14. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 91-108.
    15. Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
    16. Frederick T. Furlong & Michael C. Keeley, 1986. "Bank regulation and the public interest," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Spr, pages 55-71.
    17. Koski, Heli, 2002. "The Impacts of Regulatory Reform on the Global Telecommunications Sector," Discussion Papers 649, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    18. Mitja Cok & Polona Domadenik & Tjasa Redek & Miroslav Verbic, 2009. "Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory: The case of Slovenia," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business, vol. 27(1), pages 57-82.
    19. Liao Zhimin, 2015. "No Proper Name, No Proper Conduct: Company Affiliation and Product Quality in Wenzhou," Man and the Economy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 45-67, June.
    20. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    21. Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V., 2013. "Merger waves following industry deregulation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 51-76.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:11:y:2001:i:4:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.