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Spectrum Policy and the Evolution of the Wireless Internet: Some Thoughts on Where Economists Agree and Disagree

Author

Listed:
  • Hahn Robert

    (Director of Economics and Professor, Smith School, University of Oxford; and senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy)

  • Passell Peter

    (Senior fellow at the Milken Institute; and Editor, The Milken Institute Review)

Abstract

This essay reviews public policies for spectrum use, distinguishing among them by whether economists agree on their value and why. Spectrum policy could have a large impact on the development of the Internet and the pace of technological change in the wireless industry. We conclude that economists agree on many aspects, but substantive disagreements remain on some important issues – notably on using spectrum policy as a tool for addressing potential sources of inefficiency in the wireless market.

Suggested Citation

  • Hahn Robert & Passell Peter, 2013. "Spectrum Policy and the Evolution of the Wireless Internet: Some Thoughts on Where Economists Agree and Disagree," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 29-37, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:evoice:v:10:y:2013:i:1:p:29-37:n:6
    DOI: 10.1515/ev-2013-0020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Thomas W. Hazlett & David Porter & Vernon Smith, 2011. "Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(S4), pages 125-165.
    3. Hahn, Robert W. & Ulph, Alistair (ed.), 2012. "Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199692873, Decembrie.
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    Keywords

    economist; policy; spectrum;
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