Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1458
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Cited by:
- Strausz, Roland & Krähmer, Daniel, 2011.
"The Benefits of Sequential Screening,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8629, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2011. "The Benefits of Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 363, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 303, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2016. "Sequential screening and the relationship between principal's preferences and agent's incentives," SERIES 01-2016, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2016.
- Bose, Subir, 2014. "Monopolistic screening and uninformed buyers," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 348-353.
- Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016.
"Optimal sequential delegation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
- Kovác, Eugen & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Optimal Sequential Delegation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 427, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2015. "Sequential screening with privately known characteristics of cost distribution," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201502, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Litterscheid, Sina & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "Sequential, multidimensional screening," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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Keywords
monopolistic screening; sequential screening; adverse selection; ex post private information;All these keywords.
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