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A Note on Cohabitation and Marriage

Author

Listed:
  • Jelnov Artyom

    (Ariel University, Ariel, Israel)

  • Jelnov Pavel

    (Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany)

Abstract

Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Jelnov Artyom & Jelnov Pavel, 2018. "A Note on Cohabitation and Marriage," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-9, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:2:p:9:n:9
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0151
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert, 2013. "Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from Marriage in the U.S., 1950-2010," IZA Discussion Papers 7607, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, February.
    3. Steve Laufer & Ahu Gemici, 2009. "Marriage and Cohabitation," 2009 Meeting Papers 1191, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Hill Kulu & Paul Boyle, 2010. "Premarital cohabitation and divorce: Support for the "Trial Marriage" Theory?," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 23(31), pages 879-904.
    5. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
    6. Iyigun, Murat, 2009. "Marriage, Cohabitation and Commitment," IZA Discussion Papers 4341, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; cohabitation;

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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