Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0196
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Cited by:
- Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2021. "Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis And Experimental Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(2), pages 722-739, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
asymmetric auctions; first price auction; second price auction; sequential bidding;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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