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Auctions with resale at a later date

Author

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  • Sanyyam Khurana

    (TERI School of Advanced Studies)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular, the auction’s winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanyyam Khurana, 2024. "Auctions with resale at a later date," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 843-875, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:78:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01577-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Resale; Later date; Time delay; Asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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