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Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend

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  • Ola Olsson

Abstract

Many countries that produce rough diamonds have experienced a highly adverse pattern of economic development. In this article, we propose that the primary reason for the negative impact is that diamonds easily become the prize in predatory struggles between loot‐seeking rebels and more or less kleptocratic governments. In weakly institutionalised countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, this theory works well, but it does not explain the impressive growth record of diamond‐rich Botswana and Namibia. For a deeper understanding of these countries’ success, we point at the crucial differences between kimberlite and alluvial mining and the effect of having the world‐leading firm De Beers as a partner. Indeed, we argue that in countries like Angola, diamonds can never be a major vehicle for sustained growth, although the ongoing Kimberley process for eliminating conflict diamonds probably has contributed to making several African countries more stable.

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  • Ola Olsson, 2006. "Diamonds Are a Rebel's Best Friend," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1133-1150, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:29:y:2006:i:8:p:1133-1150
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00809.x
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    1. Al-Ubaydli, Omar & McCabe, Kevin & Twieg, Peter, 2014. "Can More Be Less? An Experimental Test of the Resource Curse," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 39-58, April.
    2. Congdon Fors, Heather & Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Endogenous institutional change after independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1896-1921, November.
    3. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 2008. "Development and Growth in Mineral-Rich Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 7031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Graham Davis, 2011. "The resource drag," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 155-176, June.
    5. Thorvaldur Gylfason, 2011. "Natural Resource Endowment: A Mixed Blessing?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3353, CESifo.
    6. Adwoa Asantewaa & Tooraj Jamasb & Manuel Llorca, 2022. "Electricity Sector Reform Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Parametric Distance Function Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-29, March.
    7. Eregha, P.B. & Mesagan, Ekundayo Peter, 2016. "Oil resource abundance, institutions and growth: Evidence from oil producing African countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 603-619.
    8. Maconachie, Roy, 2009. "Diamonds, governance and 'local' development in post-conflict Sierra Leone: Lessons for artisanal and small-scale mining in sub-Saharan Africa?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 71-79.
    9. Davide Fiaschi, 2009. "Natural Resources, Social Conflict and Poverty Trap," Discussion Papers 2009/82, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    10. Zarach, Zuzanna Helena & Parteka, Aleksandra, 2023. "Export diversification and dependence on natural resources," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    11. Carl-Johan Dalgaard & Ola Olsson, 0. "Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 17(suppl_1), pages -109.
    12. Knobel, Alexander, 2013. "The risks of fiscal policy in countries rich in natural resources," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 29-38, October.
    13. Prof. Dr Shahida Wizarat, 2014. "Natural Resources, Conflict and Growth: Uncovering the Transmission Mechanism," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 4(8), pages 987-1000, August.
    14. Azarnert, Leonid V., 2018. "Trade, Luxury Goods, And A Growth-Enhancing Tariff," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(6), pages 1462-1474, September.
    15. Olsson, Ola & Hansson, Gustav, 2011. "Country size and the rule of law: Resuscitating Montesquieu," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 613-629, June.
    16. Shahida Wizarat, 2013. "Natural Resources, Conflict and Growth Nexus," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 3(8), pages 1063-1082, August.
    17. Al-Ubaydli, Omar, 2012. "Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 137-152.

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    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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