IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/socsci/v101y2020i5p1712-1727.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock: Analyzing Divided Government Through the Lens of Majority Rule

Author

Listed:
  • William Bianco
  • Regina Smyth

Abstract

Objective It is widely argued that a primary source of legislative deadlock in America is the combination of a secular increase in polarization, combined with constitutional provisions that divide law‐making power across branches. We argue that polarization affects productivity, but only given a particular pattern of divided government. We distinguish between split branches, where a president from one party faces a Congress controlled by the other, and split chambers, where each party controls one house of Congress. Methods Multivariate analysis of enactment data from post‐War Congresses, augmented by data on House and Senate Uncovered Sets. Results Enactments of major legislation are less likely given split chambers compared to the other options and polarization has no impact after controlling for these factors. Conclusion These results redefine the conditions under which polarization drives deadlock. They also explain why the increase in polarization over the last two decades has until recently had little impact on major enactments.

Suggested Citation

  • William Bianco & Regina Smyth, 2020. "The Bicameral Roots of Congressional Deadlock: Analyzing Divided Government Through the Lens of Majority Rule," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1712-1727, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:101:y:2020:i:5:p:1712-1727
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12811
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12811
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ssqu.12811?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nolan McCarty & Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 2008. "Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262633612, April.
    2. Bianco, William T. & Sened, Itai, 2005. "Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 361-371, August.
    3. James Rogers, 2005. "The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 217-233, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Noble, Benjamin S. & Turner, Ian R, 2024. "Presidential Leadership and Legislative Polarization," SocArXiv sa9ke, Center for Open Science.
    2. Funke, Manuel & Schularick, Moritz & Trebesch, Christoph, 2016. "Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 227-260.
    3. Hayashida, Sherilyn & La Croix, Sumner & Coffman, Makena, 2021. "Understanding changes in electric vehicle policies in the U.S. states, 2010–2018," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 211-223.
    4. Jacob Jensen & Ethan Kaplan & Suresh Naidu & Laurence Wilse-Samson, 2012. "Political Polarization and the Dynamics of Political Language: Evidence from 130 Years of Partisan Speech," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 45(2 (Fall)), pages 1-81.
    5. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/f6h8764enu2lskk9p4a36i6c0 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Oren M. Levin-Waldman, 2017. "Is Inequality Designed or Preordained?," SAGE Open, , vol. 7(2), pages 21582440177, April.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Vladimir Novak & Andrei Matveenko & Silvio Ravaioli, 2021. "The Status Quo and Belief Polarization of Inattentive Agents: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 674, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    9. Joshua Y. Lerner, 2018. "Getting the message across: evaluating think tank influence in Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 347-366, June.
    10. Boxell, Levi, 2020. "Demographic change and political polarization in the United States," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    11. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    12. Below, Amy, 2013. "Obstacles in energy security: An analysis of congressional and presidential framing in the United States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 860-868.
    13. Bernecker, Andreas, 2016. "Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 24-38.
    14. David Rueda, 2014. "Food Comes First, Then Morals: Redistribution Preferences, Altruism and Group Heterogeneity in Western Europe," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 200, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    15. Gyung-Ho Jeong, 2017. "The supermajority core of the US Senate and the failure to join the League of Nations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(3), pages 325-343, December.
    16. Steven Callander & Keith Krehbiel, 2014. "Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(4), pages 819-834, October.
    17. Reza Mousavi & Bin Gu, 2019. "The Impact of Twitter Adoption on Lawmakers’ Voting Orientations," Service Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 133-153, March.
    18. Schelker, Mark, 2018. "Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 131-144.
    19. Nathan Canen & Chad Kendall & Francesco Trebbi, 2020. "Unbundling Polarization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 1197-1233, May.
    20. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019. "Echo chambers and their effects on economic and political outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101413, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    21. Im, Hyun Joong & Kim, Jiyeon & Ryu, Dean, 2023. "Unified government and the value of cash holdings," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PC).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:101:y:2020:i:5:p:1712-1727. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0038-4941 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.