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Issue linkage versus ringfencing in international agreements

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  • Ngo Van Long
  • Martin Richardson
  • Frank Stähler

Abstract

Issue linkage is often regarded as a means to enhance international cooperation in the presence of a sovereignty constraint. This constraint means a country can leave an agreement whenever it likes, if the perceived gains from leaving are larger than the gains from staying in the agreement. We set up a model of international agreements in which future gains from cooperation are uncertain, and it is bad realizations that can lead to exit. In this environment, we show that ringfencing dominates issue linkage, even in the absence of complementarities between separate issues, if the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently large.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngo Van Long & Martin Richardson & Frank Stähler, 2023. "Issue linkage versus ringfencing in international agreements," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 489-516, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:125:y:2023:i:2:p:489-516
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12521
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    References listed on IDEAS

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