IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/sajeco/v69y2001i2p359-363.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On The Social Costs Of Capital Gains Tax: An Expository Note

Author

Listed:
  • ZA Spindler

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • ZA Spindler, 2001. "On The Social Costs Of Capital Gains Tax: An Expository Note," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 69(2), pages 359-363, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:69:y:2001:i:2:p:359-363
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1813-6982.2001.tb00017.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1813-6982.2001.tb00017.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1813-6982.2001.tb00017.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pa Black, 2000. "Capital Gains Tax: Critical Notes," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 68(4), pages 352-354, December.
    2. Tullock, Gordon, 1997. "Where Is the Rectangle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 149-159, April.
    3. Tj Steenekamp, 2000. "Good Tax Practice and Taxing Capital Gains," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 68(4), pages 348-351, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2017. "The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 375-390, October.
    3. Subhashish Modak Chowdhury, 2009. "The all-pay auction with non-monotonic payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Karl Aiginger & Michael Pfaffermayr, 1999. "Product Quality, Cost Asymmetry and the Welfare Loss of Oligopoly," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 165-180.
    5. Evan Osborne, 2004. "Corruption and Its Alternatives: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance," ISER Discussion Paper 0604, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    6. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits," CESifo Working Paper Series 6462, CESifo.
    7. Murray, Cameron K., 2012. "Markets in political influence: rent-seeking, networks and groups," MPRA Paper 42070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Benjamin Powell, 2012. "Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 195-208, January.
    9. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Ana & Del Rosal, Ignacio & Baños, José, 2002. "Rent-Seeking Measurement in Coal Mining by Means of Labour Unrest: An Application of the Distance Function," Efficiency Series Papers 2002/02, University of Oviedo, Department of Economics, Oviedo Efficiency Group (OEG).
    10. Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay, 2003. "Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 95-105, June.
    11. Paul C. Cheshire & Gerard H. Dericks, 2020. "‘Trophy Architects’ and Design as Rent‐seeking: Quantifying Deadweight Losses in a Tightly Regulated Office Market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 87(348), pages 1078-1104, October.
    12. Andrew Smith & Graham Brownlow, 2023. "Informal Institutions as Inhibitors of Rent-Seeking Entrepreneurship: Evidence From U.S. Legal History," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(6), pages 2323-2346, November.
    13. Cameron K Murray, 2014. "Resolving rent-seeking puzzles: A model of political influence via social signals," Discussion Papers Series 528, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    14. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    15. David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
    16. Di Johnson & John Rodwell & Thomas Hendry, 2021. "Analyzing the Impacts of Financial Services Regulation to Make the Case That Buy-Now-Pay-Later Regulation Is Failing," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-20, February.
    17. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long, 2017. "The social cost of contestable benefits," CIRANO Working Papers 2017s-11, CIRANO.
    18. José Casas–Pardo & Juan Montoro–Pons, 2001. "On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-253, September.
    19. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:sajeco:v:69:y:2001:i:2:p:359-363. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.