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Pay to protect: Examining the factors of the use of market‐based instruments for local water sustainability

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  • Daniel Benjamin Bailey
  • Sung‐Wook Kwon
  • Nathaniel Wright

Abstract

Given the myriad of policy instruments aimed at enhancing water quantity conservation available to municipalities, what drives them to opt for a market‐based instrument (MBI)? MBIs can be effective and efficient policy instruments to enhance water quantity conservation, but there is little known about why municipalities utilize them. This study hypothesizes that three contextual elements influence a municipality's use of an MBI: the natural, political, and structural environment. The results from two logistic regression models suggest that in a municipality suffering a higher drought level, both a conservative political environment and operating under a council‐manager form of government (with the effect more pronounced under a non‐council‐manager form) will increase the likelihood that it will use an MBI to address water conservation. Dada la miríada de instrumentos de política destinados a mejorar la conservación de la cantidad de agua disponible para los municipios, ¿qué los impulsa a optar por un instrumento basado en el mercado (MBI)? Los MBI pueden ser instrumentos de política efectivos y eficientes para mejorar la conservación de la cantidad de agua, pero se sabe poco acerca de por qué los municipios los utilizan. Este estudio plantea la hipótesis de que tres elementos contextuales influyen en el uso de un MBI por parte de un municipio: el entorno natural, político y estructural. Los resultados de dos modelos de regresión logística sugieren que en un municipio que sufre un nivel más alto de sequía, tanto un entorno político conservador como el funcionamiento bajo una forma de gobierno de concejo‐administrador (con el efecto más pronunciado bajo una forma de no concejo‐administrador) aumentarán la probabilidad de que utilice un MBI para abordar la conservación del agua. 鉴于城市在加强水量保护方面拥有大量政策工具,是什么促使其选择基于市场的工具(MBI)?MBI能成为加强水量保护的有效且高效的政策工具,但几乎没有研究聚焦于城市为何使用MBI。本研究假设,三个情境要素能影响城市对MBI的使用:自然环境、政治环境以及结构环境。两个逻辑回归模型得出的结果表明,在干旱程度较高的城市中,保守的政治环境和在理事会‐经理形式的政府下运作一事都会增加城市使用MBI来应对节水问题的可能性,而这种可能性在非理事会‐经理形式的政府中会更明显。

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Benjamin Bailey & Sung‐Wook Kwon & Nathaniel Wright, 2023. "Pay to protect: Examining the factors of the use of market‐based instruments for local water sustainability," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 40(2), pages 207-229, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:40:y:2023:i:2:p:207-229
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12521
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