IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/reesec/v22y1994i4p583-602.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Contigent Price Contracts and the Efficiency of Housing Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen Day Cauley

Abstract

Frequently, the response of housing markets to a large negative demand shock is a period during which the liquidity of housing declines, but the price at which transactions take place changes little. In this paper we show that a decline in liquidity can result from the inabilities of sellers and buyers to insure against post‐shock price uncertainty. We conclude, that the introduction of a risk‐sharing contingent price contract may increase the post‐shock liquidity of housing by providing insurance against post‐shock price uncertainty. Finally, we show that a mutually agreeable contingent price contract will always exist, even when sellers are excessively optimistic.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Day Cauley, 1994. "Contigent Price Contracts and the Efficiency of Housing Markets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 22(4), pages 583-602, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:22:y:1994:i:4:p:583-602
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.00650
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.00650
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-6229.00650?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    2. Mervyn A. King & Jonathan I. Leape, 1984. "Wealth and Portfolio Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marco Bassetto, 2002. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2167-2195, November.
    2. Bester, Helmut, 2013. "Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 302-311.
    3. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
    4. Haliassos, Michael & Hassapis, Christis, 2001. "Non-expected Utility, Saving and Portfolios," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 69-102, January.
    5. Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2021. "Screening by mode of trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 400-420.
    6. Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
    7. Arnold Polanski & Emiliya Lazarova, 2015. "Dynamic multilateral markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 815-833, November.
    8. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
    9. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Ex Ante Capacity Effects in Evolutionary Labor Markets with Adaptive Search," ISU General Staff Papers 199810010700001046, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Michael Haliassos & Alexander Michaelides, 2003. "Portfolio Choice and Liquidity Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 143-177, February.
    11. Ennis, H.M.Huberto M., 2004. "Macroeconomic fluctuations and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 322-340, April.
    12. Charness, Gary & Corominas-Bosch, Margarida & Frechette, Guillaume R., 2007. "Bargaining and network structure: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 28-65, September.
    13. Rafael R. Guthmann, 2024. "Price dispersion in dynamic competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(4), pages 1203-1232, December.
    14. Luc Arrondel & André Masson, 1989. "Déterminants individuels de la composition du patrimoine : France 1980," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(3), pages 441-502.
    15. Bester, H., 1991. "Bargaining V.S. Price Competition in a Market with Quality Uncertainty," Papers 9113, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    16. Pissarides, Christopher & Mortensen, Dale T., 2001. "Taxes, Subsidies and Equilibrium Labour Market Outcomes," CEPR Discussion Papers 2989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Coles, Melvyn G. & Wright, Randall, 1998. "A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 32-54, January.
    18. Simon Jäger & Benjamin Schoefer & Samuel Young & Josef Zweimüller, 2020. "Wages and the Value of Nonemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(4), pages 1905-1963.
    19. Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan & Torero, Maximo & Vesterlund, Lise, 2013. "Gender differences in bargaining outcomes: A field experiment on discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 35-48.
    20. Christelis, Dimitris & Georgarakos, Dimitris & Haliassos, Michael, 2008. "Economic integration and mature portfolios," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/05, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:22:y:1994:i:4:p:583-602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/areueea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.