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Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

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  • Lilia Cavallari
  • Debora Di Gioacchino

Abstract

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.

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  • Lilia Cavallari & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 264-276, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:264-276
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00275.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2003. "Fiscal and monetary policy coordination in EMU," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(4), pages 279-295.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2021. "Policy conflict, coordination, and leadership in a monetary union under imperfect instrument substitutability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 342-361.
    2. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    3. Tomasz Michalak & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2009. "Strategic Interactions between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Multi-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 2534, CESifo.
    4. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2016. "Can monetary policy fully stabilize pure demand shocks in a monetary union with a fiscal leader?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 463-468.
    5. Chortareas, Georgios & Mavrodimitrakis, Christos, 2017. "Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 133-147.
    6. Marcelo Bianconi & Walter H. Fisher, 2014. "Intertemporal Budget Policies and Macroeconomic Adjustment in Indebted Open Economies," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 116-130, February.

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