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Progressive Lending as an Enforcement Mechanism in Microfinance Programs

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  • Dominik Egli

Abstract

Microfinance programs are often characterized by progressive lending. A typical borrower receives at first very small amounts, which increase with good repayment conduct. The author rationalizes this feature of microfinance. It is shown that there is a strong tendency to split up projects into subprojects, and that it might be necessary to perform less productive projects first in order to keep pressure on the borrower to repay.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominik Egli, 2004. "Progressive Lending as an Enforcement Mechanism in Microfinance Programs," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 505-520, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:505-520
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2004.00249.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Knar Khachatryan & Emma Avetisyan, 2017. "Microfinance development in Armenia: Sectoral characteristics and problems," Post-Print hal-01695638, HAL.
    2. Ulf Römer & Oliver Mußhoff & Ron Weber & Calum Turvey, 2017. "Wie ehrlich sind Kunden von Mikrofinanzinstituten? Ein Bogus-Pipeline-Experiment zur Untersuchung asymmetrischer Information im Mikrofinanzsektor auf den Philippinen [How Honest are Clients of Micr," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 153-172, June.
    3. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Discussion Paper 2010-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, 2013. "Subjectivity in credit allocation to micro-entrepreneurs: evidence from Brazil," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 263-275, June.
    5. Imke Hering & Oliver Musshoff, 2017. "Progressive Lending in Microfinance—What about the Farmers?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 803-828, August.
    6. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 40d5005c-1626-4511-aa8a-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Blanco-Oliver, A.J. & Irimia-Diéguez, A.I. & Vázquez-Cueto, M.J., 2023. "Is there an optimal microcredit size to maximize the social and financial efficiencies of microfinance institutions?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    8. Godfroid, Cécile & Otiti, Naome & Mersland, Roy, 2022. "Employee tenure and staff performance: The case of a social enterprise," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 457-467.
    9. Naveen Kumar K, 2012. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance Group Lending," SAGE Open, , vol. 2(2), pages 21582440124, April.
    10. Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2023. "A theory of progressive lending," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 211-227.
    11. Bruno, Olivier & Khachatryan, Knar, 2020. "Compulsory versus voluntary savings as an incentive mechanism in microfinance programs," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C).
    12. Francesco Cecchi & Tinka Koster & Robert Lensink, 2021. "Liquidity defaults and progressive lending in microfinance: A lab‐in‐the field experiment in Bolivia," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 2013-2030, November.
    13. Nahla Dhib & Arvind Ashta, 2020. "How far can we go? Determining the optimal loan size in progressive lending," Working Papers hal-03001840, HAL.
    14. Shapiro, D.A., 2015. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 73-84.
    15. Dyotona Dasgupta & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2020. "Simultaneous Borrowing and Saving in Microfinance," Discussion Papers 20-09, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    16. Kirschenmann, K., 2010. "The Dynamics in Requested and Granted Loan Terms when Bank and Borrower Interact Repeatedly," Other publications TiSEM 300df022-4701-4773-a8b7-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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