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Group Lending under Dynamic Incentives as a Borrower Discipline Device

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  • Bruce Wydick

Abstract

In recent years group lending has become an increasingly utilized tool for providing credit access to the poor in developing countries. Using empirical results from first‐hand field research on Guatemalan borrowing groups, this paper develops a simple game‐theoretic model of group lending. Results from the model show that through peer monitoring, the threat of group expulsion, and the safety net of intragroup credit insurance, group lending mitigates some risky investment behavior that would otherwise occur under an individual borrowing contract. The credible threat of social sanctions against group members who misallocate borrowed capital further reduces instances of such behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Wydick, 2001. "Group Lending under Dynamic Incentives as a Borrower Discipline Device," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 406-420, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:5:y:2001:i:3:p:406-420
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00132
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    Cited by:

    1. Jaffery, Ada & Mamoon, Dawood, 2015. "Socio-economic Perspective of Microfinance as a poverty reduction tool," MPRA Paper 81485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Madajewicz, Malgosia, 2011. "Joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 107-123, February.
    3. repec:dgr:rugsom:07004 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alessandra Cassar & Lucas Crowley & Bruce Wydick, 2005. "The effect of social capital on group loan repayment: Evidence from artefactual field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00036, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Labie, Marc & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Mersland, Roy & Szafarz, Ariane, 2015. "Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 44-55.
    6. ZOUARI, Zeineb & NABI, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Enhancing the Enforceability of Islamic Microfinance Contracts in OIC countries," MPRA Paper 49816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Distefano, Rosaria, 2022. "The social cost of playing by the rules in the credit market," MPRA Paper 115326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Hermes, Niels & Lensink, Robert & Mehrteab, Habteab T., 2005. "Peer Monitoring, Social Ties and Moral Hazard in Group Lending Programs: Evidence from Eritrea," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 149-169, January.
    9. Cao, Bin & Zhong, Yuanguang & Zhou, Yong-Wu, 2024. "The role of completely joint liability in financing multiple capital-constrained firms: Risk sharing, inventory and financial strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1072-1087.
    10. George Okello Candiya Bongomin & Joseph Mpeera Ntayi & John C. Munene & Charles Malinga Akol, 2017. "Financial intermediation and financial inclusion of poor households: Mediating role of social networks in rural Uganda," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 1362184-136, January.
    11. Lensink, Robert & Eijkel, Remco van & Hermes, Niels, 2007. "Group lending and the role of the group leader:Theory and evidence from Eritrea," Research Report 07004, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    12. Remco Eijkel & Niels Hermes & Robert Lensink, 2011. "Group lending and the role of the group leader," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 299-321, April.
    13. Kugler, Maurice & Oppes, Rossella, 2005. "Collateral and risk sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 504, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    14. Dominik Egli, 2004. "Progressive Lending as an Enforcement Mechanism in Microfinance Programs," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 505-520, November.
    15. Jordan, Matthew R. & Dickens, William T. & Hauser, Oliver P. & Rand, David G., 2022. "The role of inequity aversion in microloan defaults," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 303-324, April.
    16. Attanasio, O.P. & Augsburg, B. & de Haas, R. & Fitzsimons, E. & Harmgart, H., 2013. "Group Lending or Individual Lending? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Rural Mongolia," Discussion Paper 2013-074, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    17. repec:dgr:rugsom:03e36 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Joel M. Guttman, 2010. "Reputation, Trust and the Logic of Group Lending," NFI Working Papers 2010-WP-02, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    19. Hameem Raees Chowdhury, 2016. "Joint-Liability in Microcredit: Evidence from Bangladesh," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 44(1), pages 105-129, March.
    20. Giorgia Barboni & Alessandra Cassar & Arturo Rodriguez Trejo & Bruce Wydick, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Joint Liability Loan Contracts: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 153-184, July.
    21. Kugler, Maurice & Oppes, Rossella, 2005. "Collateral and risk sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0504, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

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