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Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms

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  • Patrick L. Warren

Abstract

type="main"> This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increase risk of renegotiation, and increase costs. These estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting. The US federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower. This article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:2:p:395-421
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Raiteri, Emilio, 2021. "Buyers' workload and R&D procurement outcomes: Evidence from the US Air Force Research Lab," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-059, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Boland, Matthew & Godsell, David, 2021. "Bureaucratic discretion and contracting outcomes," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    3. Foarta, Dana & Ting, Michael M., 2023. "Organizational capacity and project dynamics," Working Papers 339, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 537-597.
    5. Francesco Decarolis & Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Emilio Raiteri & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Buyers' role in innovation procurement: Evidence from US military R&D contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 697-720, November.
    6. Carril, Rodrigo & Duggan, Mark, 2020. "The impact of industry consolidation on government procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense contracting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    7. Lee, Daeyong & Lee, Ju-Yeon & Josephson, Brett W., 2024. "Effects of bid protests against government agencies on firm performance: Role of interorganisational relationship," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 520-540.
    8. Marina Cavalieri & Rossana Cristaudo & Livio Ferrante & Calogero Guccio, 2019. "Does the Project Design Matter for the Performance of Infrastructure Execution? An Assessment for Italy," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 39-77, March.
    9. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona School of Economics.
    10. Seung Han Yoo, 2017. "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series 1702, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    11. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani, 2021. "The Expediting Effect of Monitoring on Infrastructural Works. A Regression-Discontinuity Approach with Multiple Assignment Variables," Papers 2102.09625, arXiv.org.
    12. Claudia Allende & Juan Pablo Atal & Rodrigo Carril & José Ignacio Cuesta & Andres Gonzalez-Lira, 2023. "Drivers of Public Procurement Prices: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets," Working Papers 1413, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.
    14. Olga Balaeva & Yuliya Rodionova & Andrei A. Yakovlev & Andrey Tkachenko, 2021. "Public Procurement Efficiency As Perceived By Market Participants: The Case Of Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 29/PSP/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    15. Iossa, Elisabetta & Decarolis, Francesco & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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