IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/joares/v62y2024i4p1405-1448.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting

Author

Listed:
  • BRAD NATHAN

Abstract

This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or expect multiple bids. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that above‐threshold contracts experience greater competition (i.e., more bids), improved performance (i.e., less frequent renegotiations and cost overruns), and reduced use of the harder‐to‐monitor cost‐plus pricing, compared to below‐threshold contracts. These findings suggest that TINA's requirements enhance competition and oversight for above‐threshold contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Brad Nathan, 2024. "Show Your Hand: The Impacts of Fair Pricing Requirements in Procurement Contracting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 1405-1448, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:62:y:2024:i:4:p:1405-1448
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12561
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12561
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1475-679X.12561?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bernard, Darren, 2016. "Is the risk of product market predation a cost of disclosure?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 305-325.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2008. "Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 426-447, April.
    3. Bernard, Darren & Burgstahler, David & Kaya, Devrimi, 2018. "Size management by European private firms to minimize proprietary costs of disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 94-122.
    4. Ján Palguta & Filip Pertold, 2017. "Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 293-315, May.
    5. Matthias Breuer & Christian Leuz & Steven Vanhaverbeke, 2019. "Reporting Regulation and Corporate Innovation," NBER Working Papers 26291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Patrick L. Warren, 2014. "Contracting officer workload, incomplete contracting, and contractual terms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 395-421, June.
    7. Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 180-212, August.
    8. Jonathan Brogaard & Matthew Denes & Ran Duchin & David Denis, 2021. "Political Influence and the Renegotiation of Government Contracts," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(6), pages 3095-3137.
    9. Francesco Decarolis, 2014. "Awarding Price, Contract Performance, and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 108-132, January.
    10. João Granja, 2018. "Disclosure Regulation in the Commercial Banking Industry: Lessons from the National Banking Era," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 173-216, March.
    11. Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-123, May.
    12. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steven Tadelis, 2014. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1288-1319, April.
    13. Tomy, Rimmy E., 2019. "Threat of entry and the use of discretion in banks’ financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 1-35.
    14. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    15. Jonas Heese & Gerardo Pérez‐Cavazos, 2019. "Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 675-719, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Rodrigo Carril, 2021. "Rules Versus Discretion in Public Procurement," Working Papers 1232, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Matthias Breuer, 2021. "How Does Financial‐Reporting Regulation Affect Industry‐Wide Resource Allocation?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 59-110, March.
    3. Raphael Duguay & Thomas Rauter & Delphine Samuels, 2023. "The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 1159-1224, September.
    4. Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.
    5. Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
    6. Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2019. "When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 205-236, September.
    7. Snježana Deno & Thomas Loy & Carsten Homburg, 2020. "What Happens If Private Accounting Information Becomes Public? Small Firms’ Access to Bank Debt," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 44(6), pages 1091-1111, November.
    8. Kris De Jaegher & Michal Šoltés & Vitezslav Titl, 2024. "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series 11603, CESifo.
    9. Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023. "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp757, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    10. Lee, Daeyong & Lee, Ju-Yeon & Josephson, Brett W., 2024. "Effects of bid protests against government agencies on firm performance: Role of interorganisational relationship," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 520-540.
    11. Bernard, Darren & Kaya, Devrimi & Wertz, John, 2021. "Entry and capital structure mimicking in concentrated markets: The role of incumbents’ financial disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2).
    12. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies," Working Papers 1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    13. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Ilde Rizzo & Marco Valente, 2023. "Public procurement and reputation. An agent‐based model," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(4), pages 806-832, November.
    14. Hatsumi, Kentaro & Ishii, Rieko, 2022. "The effect of price on the quality of public construction in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    15. Laura Rondi & Paola Valbonesi, 2017. "Pre- and post-award outsourcing: Temporary partnership versus subcontracting in public procurement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0211, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    16. Henry Eyring, 2020. "Disclosing Physician Ratings: Performance Effects and the Difficulty of Altering Ratings Consensus," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 1023-1067, September.
    17. Drahomir Klimsa & Robert Ullmann, 2023. "Threshold-dependent tax enforcement and the size distribution of firms: evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(4), pages 1002-1035, August.
    18. Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2020. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes [“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 537-597.
    19. Albring, Susan M. & Xu, Xiaolu, 2018. "Management earnings forecasts, managerial incentives, and risk-taking," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 48-69.
    20. Wenxiu Hu & Jinzhu Du & Weiguo Zhang, 2020. "Corporate Social Responsibility Information Disclosure and Innovation Sustainability: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-19, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:62:y:2024:i:4:p:1405-1448. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-8456 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.