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Did Good Institutions Produce Good Tariffs? Evidence From Tariff Protection In Colonial Victoria

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  • JOHN K. WILSON
  • MARTIN P. SHANAHAN

Abstract

Were tariff rates in the Australian colony of Victoria directed towards growth‐enhancing industries or rent seekers? Recent research suggests tariffs may be welfare enhancing if they are directed at industries with positive externalities; something more likely when institutions are strong. Using disaggregated tariff data for the years 1872, 1880, and 1890, we analyse the relationship between industry characteristics and tariffs, finding little evidence that Victorian industries with positive externalities received tariff protection. Our results throw doubt on good institutions necessarily producing good tariff outcomes and suggest the relationship between tariffs and growth is more complex than current studies assume.

Suggested Citation

  • John K. Wilson & Martin P. Shanahan, 2012. "Did Good Institutions Produce Good Tariffs? Evidence From Tariff Protection In Colonial Victoria," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 52(2), pages 128-147, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ozechr:v:52:y:2012:i:2:p:128-147
    DOI: j.1467-8446.2012.00346.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Brian D. Varian, 2022. "Revisiting the tariff‐growth correlation: The Australasian colonies, 1866–1900," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 47-65, March.
    2. Rajabrata Banerjee & John K. Wilson, 2016. "Roles of Education in Productivity Growth in Australia, 1860–1939," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(296), pages 47-66, March.
    3. Brian D. Varian, 2024. "The unavailing origin of Australian protectionism? Victoria's McCulloch Tariff of 1866," CEH Discussion Papers 08, Centre for Economic History, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.

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